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TO BE OR NOT TO BE, SHOULD DOCTORS DECIDE?
ETHICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL
FUTILITY POLICIES
Maureen Kwiecinski*
In 2005, Spiro Nikolouzos was a retired electrical engineer
with significant and serious disabilities whose wife and family
cared for him at home.'
After Mr. Nikolouzos developed
problems with his feeding tube, his family sought treatment at a
local hospital. 2
Unfortunately, Mr. Nikolouzos' condition
deteriorated in the hospital, and he was placed on a ventilator.3
After some time, the health care providers treating Mr.
Nikolouzos concluded that life-sustaining treatment was not his
best interests and recommended that Mr. Nikolouzos' ventilator
be disconnected and his feeding tube withdrawn.4 However, the
Nikolouzos family rejected this conclusion and strongly objected
to the removal of life support, stating that withdrawal would be
contrary to Mr. Nikolouzos' express wishes regarding his

* Maureen Kwiecinski, is an associate at Foley & Lardner, and a registered
nurse. She earned her bachelor's in nursing from the University of Wisconsin
- Milwaukee, her masters in bioethics from the Medical College of Wisconsin,
and her law degree from Marquette University. From the author: thanks to
Kris Tym and Ryan Spellecy for their comments. All views, errors and
omissions are my own.
1. Spiro Nikolouzos had been in a persistent vegetative state since 2001. Todd
Ackerman, Life Support Removal Blocked: Appellate Court Grants Temporary Injunction to
the Family of Man at St. Luke's Hospital,HOUSTON CHRON. (Texas), Mar. 13, 2005, at B6
[hereinafter Life Support Removal]. The cause of Mr. Nikolouzos' initial condition is

somewhat uncertain.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Todd Ackerman, Burden of ProofLies With Kin of Patient; Family of Man on
Life Support at St. Luke's Must Show He Can Be Taken Elsewhere, HOUSTON CHRON.
(Texas), Mar. 19, 2005, at BI [hereinafter Burden ofProof].
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medical care.5
Despite the Nikolouzos family's objections and their
contention that withdrawal would be inconsistent with Mr.
Nikolouzos' personal preferences, health care providers
remained convinced that removing life-support would be in Mr.
Nikolouzos' best interests.
The hospital notified Mrs.
Nikolouzos that unless she could find a facility that would
assume the care of her husband, life-sustaining treatment would
be withdrawn in ten days.6 After the Nikolouzos family's frantic
search for a transfer facility failed, the hospital prepared for the
removal of treatment and started an intravenous morphine drip.
However, a last minute appeal to the court resulted in an
emergency injunction barring the removal of treatment, and
shortly thereafter Mr. Nikolouzos was transferred to another
facility. After the transfer, the Nikolouzos family, suspicious
that the hospital sought to remove treatment for financial
reasons, expressed considerable bitterness towards the hospital
and health care providers.7
Disagreements between family members and health care
providers over the withholding and withdrawal of lifesustaining medical treatment are not a new phenomenon. In the
1970's and 1980's, courts considered a number of unresolved
provider-family disagreements, most of which centered on the
following question: What should be done when a patient or his
surrogate refuses or seeks to discontinue life-sustaining medical

5. See Nicole Foy, Texas Law Gives Hospitals Right to End Life Support: It Seeks to
Balance Views of Physicians and Feelings of Families, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS

(Texas), Mar. 27, 2005, at LA. (Mr. Nikolouzos' son asserted that the family understood
Spiro would not recover, but that the decision to withdraw life-support should be made by
the family, not the hospital); In addition, the Nikolouzos family suspected that the effort to
remove life-support was triggered by the depletion of Mr. Nikolouzos' Medicare funding.
The Nikolouzos family also maintained that the hospital was being "pushy" and trying to
force the family into withdrawing support, even though it was not consistent with Spiro's
wishes. See Leigh Hopper, Hospitals Can End Life Support; Decision Hinges on Patient's
Ability to Pay, Prognosis,HOUSTON CHRON. (Texas), Mar. 8 (2005), at B6 (reporting that

the chief medical officer of a local hospital stated "[a] patient's inability to pay for medical
care combined with a prognosis that renders further care futile are two reasons a hospital
might suggest cutting off life support").
6. See Ackerman, Life Support Removal, supra note 1.
7. See Hopper,supra note 5.
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treatment, but health care providers favor more aggressive care?
This question, and other end-of-life treatment disputes, brought
physicians, patients, and family members to courthouses across
the nation, resulting in several United States Supreme Court
decisions and a myriad of appellate and lower court opinions.
Recently, however, the focus of debate has shifted to an
opposing question: What should be done when health care
providers contend that a life-sustaining medical intervention,
such as ventilatory support, dialysis, or artificial feeding, should
be withheld or withdrawn but the patient or family members
disagree?
Futility policy supporters claim that health care providers,
as a consequence of their expertise and training, are best able to
determine when continuing medical treatment is no longer
worthwhile. As a result of this argument, if health care
providers decide that a treatment lacks benefit, and is therefore
"futile," providers should have the discretion to withhold or
withdraw even life-sustaining interventions without the consent
of the patient or family members.8 Futility policy critics contend
that decisions regarding the benefits and burdens of lifesustaining treatment are inherently subjective and value-laden
determinations; since health care providers, have limited
knowledge of their patients' preferences and may be improperly
influenced by bias, prejudice, or institutional pressures, they are
ill-equipped to render accurate and objective decisions.
Therefore, when a disagreement about life-sustaining medical
treatment arises, the goals of the patient, as described by the
patient or his or her family, should guide decision-making.9
Despite these differences in opinion, in the mid to late
1990's, professional organizations and policy supporters
advocated for the development of institutional "futility policies"

8. See Susan Rubin, WHEN DOCTORS SAY No: THE BATTLEGROUND OF MEDICAL

FUTILITY 56-57 (Indiana University Press 1998).
9. See, e.g., Michael Ardagh, Futility Has No Utility in Resuscitation Medicine, 26 J.
MED. ETHICS 396, 396 (Oct. 2000); Leigh Turner, Recognizing the Persistenceofan Ethical
Conflict: Disputes Concerning What Constitutes Appropriate Levels of Care: Part I, 18
ANNALS LONG TERM CARE 15, 18 (2004).
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to address provider-family conflicts concerning "futile" or
"medically inappropriate" treatment.10 While the content of
these policies varies considerably, some policies provide that a
physician who determines that a treatment is "futile" or
"inappropriate" can withhold or withdraw the treatment
without the consent of the patient or a surrogate decisionmaker.n In 1999, the Texas legislature took the unprecedented
step of codifying a futility policy, creating a legislatively
approved, largely extrajudicial process that allows physicians to
remove life-sustaining treatment without the consent of the
patient or family members.12
The development and implementation of futility policies is
not without controversy and many have questioned whether
policies that allow health care providers to act unilaterally are
ethically and legally acceptable. Despite the support of various
professional organizations, commentators and practitioners
continue to ask: Are health care providers' opinions regarding a
treatment's "futility" sufficient to ethically justify a unilateral
decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment? And, even if a
unilateral decision can be supported ethically, do the processes
set forth in futility policies, whether statutory or institutional,
adequately protect the due process rights of individuals, and the
vital interests of vulnerable populations, such as the elderly or
the disabled?
This comment discusses both of these questions. Part I of
this article provides background on the withholding and
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and the conflicts that
10. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
MedicalFutility in End-of-Life Care: Report of the Council on Ethical and JudicialAffairs,

281 JAMA 937, 940 (1999) (stating, "[t]he Council... recommends that health care
institutions, whether large or small, adopt a policy on medical futility. . ."). Amir Halevy &
Baruch Brody, A Multi-Institution CollaborativePolicy on Medical Futility, 276 JAMA 571,
574 (1996); David Waisel & Robert Truog, The Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation-NotIndicated Order: Futility Revisited, 122 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 304, 306-308 (1995)

(discussion of four different hospital policies); Sandra Johnson et al., Legal andInstitutional
Policy Responses to Medical Futility, 30 J. HEALTH L. 21, 34 (1997).
11. See Johnson et al., supra note 10, at 27; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
166.045-166.052 (Westlaw through 2004 legislation).

12. See id

§§
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arise between providers and family members. Part II discusses
the concept of medical futility and reviews ethical justifications
and criticisms for the unilateral withholding or withdrawal of
treatment based upon medical futility. Part III explores the legal
implications of institutional and statutory futility policies,
focusing on the Texas Advance Directives Act. This section
concludes that institutional and statutory futility policies, which
allow health care providers to override the treatment
preferences of a competent patient or surrogate decision maker,
violate the common law principle of self-determination and
constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. Part IV
concludes that substantial unanswered ethical and legal
questions arise when physicians attempt to unilaterally
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from
incompetent patients pursuant to institutional or statutory
medical futility policies. Because such policies concern vital and
very personal decisions, the ethical and legal issues surrounding
these policies should be a matter of active, informed public
debate.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE WITHHOLDING OR
WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENTS

The withholding or withdrawal of life support is a process
through which medical interventions, such as ventilators and
feeding tubes," are either not implemented or are removed from
patients with the expectation that the patient's death will occur
as a result of an underlying condition. 4 Studies demonstrate
that in many countries, between seventy and ninety percent of

13. See David Asch et al., Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining Treatment by
Critical Care Physicians in the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians' Practicesand
Patients' Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 288, 290 (1995) (Life

sustaining medical interventions may also include cardiac defibrillation, blood pressure
medications, surgery, insulin, antibiotics, dialysis, intravenous fluids, and blood/blood
product transfusions.).
14. See John Luce & Ann Alpers, Legal Aspects of Withholding and Withdrawing Life
Supportfrom CriticallyIll Patients in the United States and Providing Palliative Care to
Them, 162 AM. J. REsPiR. CRIT. CARE MED. 2029, 2029 (2000).
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deaths that occur in intensive care units (ICUs) are preceded by
a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments.15
In the United States, this percentage has increased significantly
over a relatively short period of time, rising from fifty percent of
ICU patient deaths in 1987-88, to over ninety percent in 1993.16
While the increased percentage of deaths as a result of
withholding or withdrawal seems to suggest a high level of
consistency in end-of-life treatment practices, caregivers make a
wide variety of end-of-life recommendations.17 Research
demonstrates that even among groups of patients who receive
end-of-life treatment at well-respected medical centers, there are
"striking" inter-hospital and regional differences in end-of-life
care.18 At least one team of researchers concluded that these
variations in practice indicate a lack of consistent guidelines for

15. See T.J. Prendergast & J.M. Luce, Increasing Incidence of Withholding and
Withdrawal ofLife Support From the CriticallyIll, 155 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 15
(1997) (abstract); see also Sean Keenan et al., A Retrospective Review of a Large Cohortof
Patients Undergoing the Process of Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Support, 25 CRIT.

CARE MED. 1324, 1324 (1997) (confirming the high rate of withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment among patients dying in academic ICUs); Eduoard Ferrand et al.,
Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support in Intensive Care Units in France: A
Prospective Study, 357 LANCET 9, 11 (2001); Johanna Groenewoud et al., A Nationwide
Study of Decisions to Forego Life-Prolonging Treatment in Dutch Medical Practice, 160
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 357, 357 (2000).

16. See Prendergast & Luce, supra note 15, at 15.
17. See Thomas Prendergast et al., A NationalSurvey ofEnd-of-life Carefor Critically

Ill Patients, 158 AM. J.RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 1163, 1164 (1998); Robert M. Wachter et
al., Decisions About Resuscitation: Inequities Among Patients with Different Diseases But
Similar Prognoses, Il1 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 525, 525 (1989) (noting that in a survey

of physicians, despite similar prognoses, patients with AIDS or lung cancer were more
likely to get Do-Not-Resuscitate orders than patients with cirrhosis or severe congestive
heart failure.); Deborah Cook et al., Determinations in CanadianHealth Care Workers of
the Decision to Withdraw Life Support From the CriticallyIll, 273 JAMA 703, 703 (1995)

(reporting that in a study in which hypothetical scenarios involving critically ill adults were
presented to over one thousand ICU physicians and nurses, the majority of respondents
agreed on course of treatment in only 8% of cases.).
18. See John Wennberg et al., Use of Hospitals, Physician Visits and Hospice Care
During Last Six Months of Life Among Cohorts Loyal to Highly Respected Hospitals in the

United States, 328 BRITISH MED. J. 1 (2004) (reporting the following ranges: days in
hospital per decedent (9.4 to 27.1), days in intensive care (1.6 to 9.5), number of physician
visits (17.6 to 76.2), percentage of patients seeing 10 or more physicians (16.9% to 58.5%),
hospice enrolment (10.8% to 43.8%), percentage of deaths occurring in hospital ranged
(15.9% to 55.6%), percentage of deaths associated with a stay in intensive care (8.4% to
36.8%.) available at http://bmj.bmijoumals.com/cgilreprint/328/7440/607 (last visited
February 27, 2005).
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end-of-life medical treatment.19
The lack of consistent practice may be attributed in part to
the wide variety of clinical factors that health care providers
must consider when formulating end-of-life treatment
recommendations for an individual patient. 20 However,
research
demonstrates
that
differences
in
treatment
recommendations may also be associated with a number of nonclinical factors, including physicians' race and gender, 2 1 rank and
experience, 22 specialty, 23 risk aversion, 24 religious convictionS, 25

19. See Prendergast et al., supra note 17, at 1166.
20. See, e.g., Nicholas Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support

From the Critically Ill, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309, 312 (1990) (identifying poor prognosis,
futility of continued intervention, extreme suffering, and patient or family request as reasons
cited by physicians who recommended withholding or withdrawal of support.) Physicians
may also consider potential professional malpractice liability and existing institutional
standards. See Henry Perkins et al., Impact of Legal Liability, Family Wishes, and Other
'External Factors'onPhysician'sLife-Support Decisions, 89 AM. J. MED. 185, 185 (1990)

(concluding that the potential for legal liability is an especially important factor when
patient preferences are unknown). However, it appears the most commonly cited reason for
recommending the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is the opinion that
the patient's potential quality of life is poor. Asch et al., supra note 13, at 291; Keenan et
al., supra note 15, at 1327 (reporting the most common reason given for the withdrawal of
life support was poor patient prognosis (documented in 97% of cases). The next two most
commonly considered reasons were: concern with regard to patient suffering (18%), and
poor future quality of life (9%)). Accordingly, at least one commentator contends that
regardless of an explicit futility policy, some conception of medical futility underlies the
majority of withholding and withdrawal decisions.
21. See Eric Mebane et al., The Influence of Physician Race, Age, and Gender on
Physician Attitudes Toward Advance Care Directives and Preferences for End-Of-Life
Decision-Making, 47(5) J. AM. GERIATR. Soc. 579, 579 (1999) (describing significant

differences in attitudes about tube feeding between white and black physicians, and male
and female physicians. While 58% percent of white physicians agreed that tube-feeding in
terminally ill patients is a "heroic" treatment, only 28% of black physicians agreed. While
42.4% of male physicians agreed that tube-feeding is "heroic," only 28.9% of female
physicians agreed.); Id. at 583.
22. See Asch et al., supra note 13, at 291 (reporting that in a survey of end-of-life
decision-making, younger physicians were more likely than older physicians to report
withdrawing ventilator support); Panagiota Caralis & Jamey Hammond, Attitudes of
Medical Students, Housestaff and Faculty Physicians Toward Euthanasiaand Termination
of Life-sustaining Treatment. 20 CRIT. CARE MED. 683, 683 (May 1992) (finding that
faculty physicians rated disease-based information as strongly determinative of their end-of-

life treatment decisions, while students and housestaff relied more heavily on quality-of-life
factors); Nicholas Christakis & David Asch, Physician Characteristics Associated with
Decisions to Withdraw Life Support, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 367, 367 (Mar. 1995)

(reporting that physicians' personal characteristics, such as age and experience, were
associated with differences in treatment preferences and practices with regard to the
withdrawal of life support); Jeffery Rubenstein et al., PediatricResident Attitudes About
Technologic Support of Vegetative Patients and the Effects of Parental Input-A
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marital status, 26 and other factors. 27
The lack of consensus on best practices at end-of-life is
reflected in the significant incidence of inter-staff conflict when
health care providers consider the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatments. 28 In one study of ICU patients for
whom the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was
proposed, disagreements among providers occurred in almost
half the cases. 29 Not surprisingly, these providers also differ
significantly in their opinions of how satisfactory they find the

Longitudinal Study, 94 PEDIATRICS 8, 10 (Jul. 1994) (noting that the attitudes of pediatric

residents with regard to the withdrawal of treatment from terminally ill children change over
time).
23. See Laura Hanson et al., Who Decides? Physicians' Willingness to Use LifeSustaining Treatment, 156 ARCHIVES INTERN. MED. 785, 785 (1996), William F. Kelly, Do
Specialists Differ on Do-Not-Resuscitate Decisions? 121 CHEST 957, 957 (2002) (noting

that strength of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order recommendations varies with medicine
specialty, years of training and experience).
24. S.D. Nightingale & M. Grant, Risk Preference and Decisionmaking in Critical
Care Situations, 93 CHEST 684, 684 (1988).
25. See Neil Wenger & Sara Carmel, Physicians' Religiosity and End-of-Life Care
Attitudes and Behaviors, 71 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 335, 335 (2004) (noting that "[v]ery

religious physicians, compared to moderately religious and secular physicians, were much
less likely to believe that life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn . . ., to approve of
prescribing needed pain medication if it will hasten death..., or to agree with
euthanasia ..... ").
26. H. Hinkka et al., Factors Affecting Physicians' Decisions to Forgo Life-sustaining
Treatments in Terminal Care,28 J. MED. ETHICS 109, 109 (2002).
27. Nicholas Christakis & Davis Asch, Biases in How Physicians Choose to Withdraw

Life Support, 342 LANCET 642, 642 (1993) (identifying four physician biases with regard to
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment). For example, researchers exploring various
specialists' willingness to use life-sustaining treatments, reviewed the care of 151 patients
with end stage diseases. Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 785. Although the patients'
prognoses were very similar, the researchers found that cardiologists were consistently more
willing to use life-sustaining treatments and were the least likely to issue an order to
withhold treatment. Id. Alternatively, oncologists rarely used life-sustaining treatments,
and issued orders to withhold treatments more frequently. Id A study of cross-specialty
variability in end-of-life practices in a pediatric setting has also revealed marked differences
in decision-making among specialists.
28. See Catherine M. Breen et al., Conflict Associated With Decisions to Limit LifeSustaining Treatment in Intensive Care Units, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 283, 286 (2001).
29. See Sonia Frick et al., Medical Futility: Predicting Outcome ofintensive Care Unit
Patients by Nurses and Doctors-A Prospective Comparative Study, 31 CRIT. CARE MED.

456, 460 (2003). In another study, disagreements with respect to treatment strategies for
terminally ill ICU patients arose in two-thirds of the patients studied. Id. at 459 (noting that
the sicker ICU patients were and the longer they stayed in the ICU, the more the predictions
about future quality of life by physicians and nurses diverged.)

MEDICAL FUTILITY
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process of making end-of-life decisions.3
END-OF-LIFEDECISION-MAKING AND PROVIDER-FAMILY

CONFLICTS
Considering the variability of end-of-life practices, the
incidence of disagreement among health care providers, and the
frequency with which families report communication failures, 3 '
it is also not surprising that significant provider-family conflicts
arise with some frequency when the withholding or withdrawal
of life-support is considered. 32 In a 2001 study of ICU patients
for whom the withdrawal of life-support was proposed,
disagreements between providers and family members occurred
in almost half the cases. 3 However, research also indicates that
the majority of such disagreements occurred when providers
implemented or continued treatment despite patient or family
preferences to pursue less aggressive care.M Disputes in which
30. See, e.g., Edouard Ferrand et al., DiscrepanciesBetween Perceptions by Physicians
and Nursing Staff of Intensive Care Unit End-of-Life Decisions, 167 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT.

CARE MED. 1310, 1310 (2003) (describing a survey in which 73% of ICU physicians
described end-of-life decision-making processes as satisfactory, but only 33% of the ICU
nursing staff agreed. Although 90% of providers believed decision-making should be
collaborative, only 50% of physicians and 27% of nurses believed that such collaboration
existed.).
31.

See Sally Norton et al., Life Support Withdrawal: Communication and Conflict, 12

AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 548 (2003); Breen et al., supra note 28, at 287 (noting that
communication problems were primary source of identified provider-family conflicts in
46% of cases). See also E. Azoulay et al., Half the Families of ICU Patients Experience
Inadequate Communication with Physicians, 8 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3044 (2000) (noting,

as the title suggests, that significant numbers of families do not have adequate
communication with physicians. Note, however, that this study was conducted in France and
may or may not present data relevant to practice in the United States); A.P. Abernethy &
J.A. Tulsky, Disagreements That Arise When Making Decisions About Withdrawing or
Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment, 12 (Apr. Supp.) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 101
(1997). See Joan Teno et al., Family Perspectives on End-of-Life Care at the Last Place of

Care, 291 JAMA 88 (2004) (describing an end-of-life care survey in which over 50% family
members whose loved ones had died in a hospital reported not having adequate contact with
physicians); Id. at 91.
32. See Thomas Prendergast & Kathleen Puntillo, Withdrawal of Life Support:
Intensive Caringat the End of Life, 288 JAMA 2732, 2732 (2002) (noting that decisions

concerning life-sustaining treatments are "often a source of disagreement"). Id at 2732.
Conflicts also arise between family members or between the patient and family members.
See Breen et al., supra note 28, at 286.
33. See Breen et al., supra note 28, at 286.
34. See id. In the 2001 study, 76% of the provider-family conflicts identified involved
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patients or family members rejected withholding or withdrawal
recommendations and sought to continue aggressive treatment
occurred with much less frequency.35
Regardless of the nature of the disagreement, in the
majority of conflicts providers and family members are able to
reach consensus. However, substantial differences in cultural,
religious, or scientific views 3 6 and mistrust of medical
professionals37 often contribute to the deterioration of such
conflicts into intractable disputes. Communication failures, 38 the
inaccessibility of health care providers, 39 and a general lack of
patient and family involvement in decision-making@ are also
cases in which the staff wanted a more aggressive approach; 24% involved cases in which
the family wanted to continue aggressive treatment. Id See also Asch et al., supra note 13,
at 288 (reporting that 34% of ICU physicians surveyed reported that they had continued lifesustaining treatment over the objections of patients and family members); Joan Teno et al.,
Medical Care Inconsistent With Patients' Treatment Goals: Association With 1-year
Medicare Resource Use and Survival, 50 J. AM. GERIATR. Soc. 496, 496 (2002) (finding

"86% of the patients who wanted aggressive treatment reported that care was consistent
with their preferences, but only 41% of those who preferred comfort care reported that care
was consistent with their preferences. More than one-third of those with a preference for
comfort care (35%) reported that the medical care that they received was inconsistent with
their goals.") Id. at 496.
35. Id
36. See Prendergast & Puntillo, supra note 70, at 2737; Allan S. Brett & Paul Jersild,
"Inappropriate" Treatment Near the End of Life: Conflict Between Religious Convictions

and Clinical Judgment, 163 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1645 (2003); R.D. Orr & L.B.
Genesen, Requests for Inappropriate Treatment Based on Religious Beliefs, 23 J. MED.
ETHICS 142 (1997); J. Kunin, WithholdingArtificial Feeding From the Severely Demented:
Merciful or Immoral? Contrasts Between Secular and Jewish Perspectives, 29 J. MED.

ETHICS 208 (2003).
37. Renowned ethicist Arthur Caplan contends that mistrust of medical professionals
plays a central role to provider-family conflicts involving futility and cannot be ignored in
any medical futility debate. See Arthur L. Caplan, Editorial, Odds and Ends: Trust and the
Debate over Medical Futility, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 688 (1996); see also Leigh
Turner, Recognizing the Persistence of an Ethical Conflict: Disputes Concerning What
Constitutes AppropriateLevels of Care: PartII, 12 ANNALS LONG-TERM CARE 21 (2004)

("[B]reaksdowns in trust between patients... and clinicians can leave patients or family
members reluctant to accept the recommendations of physicians.") Id.
38. See Norton et al., supra note 31; Breen et al., supra note 28, at 287 (noting that
communication problems were primary source of identified provider-family conflicts in
46% of cases). See also E. Azoulay et al., Half the Families ofICU Patients Experience
Inadequate Communication with Physicians,8 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3044 (2000)
39. See Joan Teno et al., Family Perspectives on End-of-Life Care at the Last Place of

Care, 291 JAMA 88 (2004) (describing an end-of-life care survey in which over 50% of
family members reported inadequate contact with physicians.) Id. at 91.
40. See Joan Teno et al., Decision-making and Outcomes of ProlongedICU Stays in

Seriously Ill Patients,48 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y S70 (2000) (reporting that of over 9000
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problematic.
Although
provider-family
disagreements
are
not
unanticipated and "can be constructive, uncovering differences
in values and legitimate concerns that have been inadequately
discussed," 4 1 when such disagreements deteriorate into full
conflict, they become extremely burdensome for providers,
patients and family members. 42 For providers, intractable
disagreements can be demoralizing43 and a potent source of
anger and frustration." For patients and family members,
disputes generate considerable distress, leading to anxiety,
anger, distrust, and may ultimately complicate the bereavement
process. 4 5 Researchers have noted, "even minor conflicts that
were ultimately resolved generated considerable psychological
turmoil." 46
II. UNILATERAL WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWAL OF LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT BASED ON MEDICAL FUTILITY

INSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FUTILITY POLICIES

Beginning in the early 1990's, policy supporters and
professional organizations promoted the concept of futility and
advocated for the development of institutional policies intended
to address conflicts in which patients or family members request
treatment that providers deem "futile." 47 The American Medical
patients surveyed, less than 40% of patients or their surrogates reported that their physicians
had discussions with them about their prognoses or their preferences for life-sustaining
treatment.) Id.
41. Jenny Way et al., Withdrawing of Life Support and Resolution of Conflicts With
Families,325 BRIT. MED. J. 1342, 1345 (2002).
42. A.P. Abernethy & J.A. Tulsky, Disagreements That Arise When Making Decisions
About Withdrawing or Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment, 12 J. GEN. INTERN. MED.
(Apr. Supp.) 101, 101 (1997).
43. Stanley Nasraway, Unilateral Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Therapy: Is It Time?
Are We Ready? 29 CRIT. CARE MED. 215, 215 (2001).
44. Joseph d'Oronzio, DeterminingFutility, 12 CAMBRIDGE. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHIcs
214, 217 (2003) ("Caregivers providing what they think is morally questionable care, feel
professionally disenfranchised and experience a mix of anguish and anger ....
45. Abernethy & Tulsky, supra note 30, at 101.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., D.R. Gregory, VA Network Futility Guidelines:A Resource for Decisions
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Association's (AMA's) Council for Ethical and Judicial Affairs
asserted, "[A]ll health care institutions, whether large or small,
should adopt a policy on medical futility."4 8
Despite decades of widespread discussion and numerous
attempts to identify the circumstances in which a medical
intervention can be described as "futile," commentators have
been unable to agree on a practical, objective definition. 49 In an
attempt to provide guidance in identifying futile medical
interventions, commentators and practitioners have offered a
wide range of definitions.50 A "futile" medical treatment has
been described as an intervention: that is useless or ineffective;5'
that has an unacceptably low chance of achieving a therapeutic
benefit;5 2 that serves no useful purpose in attaining a specified
goal;53 that cannot achieve the patient's wishes or goals; 54 that
cannot improve the patient's prognosis, comfort, well-being, or
general state of health;5 5 that cannot end dependence on

About Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS
546, 546 (1995); D. Murphy & E. Barbour, Guide (Guidelinesfor the Use ofIntensive Care
in Denver): A Community Effort to Define Futileand InappropriateCare, 2 NEW HORIZONS
326, 326 (1994); Bay Area Network of Ethics Committees (BANEC) Nonbeneficial
Treatment Working Group, Nonbeneficial or Futile Medical Treatment: Conflict Resolution
Guidelinesfor the San Francisco Bay Area, 170 WESTERN J. MED. 287, 287-290 (1990);
See also infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
48. Id
49. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 10, at 937-938 (reviewing

the various approaches for identifying a medically futile intervention and the criticisms of
each); Kathryn Moseley et al., Futility in Evolution, 21 CLINICS GERIATR. MED. 211, 213

(2005) (describing four different approaches to defining futility); Paul Helft et al., The Rise
and Fall of Futility Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 295 (2000); see also Caplan,
supra note 37, at 688 (noting that "analysis of the concept has failed to produce a consensus
about how it should be defined or used"); R. Lofinark & T. Nilstun, Conditions and
Consequences of Medical Futility-From a Literature Review to a Clinical Model, 28 J.

MED. ETHICS 115, 115 (2002).
50. See generally Ardagh, supra note 9, at 397.
51. See Ian Kerridge et al., Competent Patients, Incompetent Decisions, 123 ANNALS
INTERN. MED. 878, 879 (1995).
52. Lawrence Schneiderman, Medical Futility and Aging: Ethical Implications,
GENERATIONS, Vol. 18, No. 4 at 61, 62 (Winter, 1994).
53. Deborah L. Kasman, When Is Medical Treatment Futile? A Guide for Students,
Residents, and Physicians, 19 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1053, 1053 (2004).
54. Id.
55. Lawrence Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical
Implications, 112 ANNALS INTER. MED. 949, 951-953 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Futility].
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intensive medical care;5 6 that is highly unlikely to result in
meaningful survival;57 that does not offer a reasonable chance of
survival;58 that merely prolongs dying;59 that is so unlikely to
succeed that many people would not consider it worthwhile; 60 or
that fails to offer a minimum quality of life or medical benefit. 6 1
Ultimately, the significant theoretical and practical
differences in proposed definitions led commentators to
conclude that medical futility is "an elusive concept," 62 and that
the struggle to achieve a practical definition of "futile treatment"
is itself futile. 63 AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
that futility is "inherently a value-laden
concluded
determination," therefore, "[a] fully objective and concrete
definition of futility is unattainable."M
Nonetheless, supporters continued to advocate for futility
policies, contending that the lack of an accepted definition is not
problematic because "most physicians now know it when they
Throughout the 1990's many institutions and
see it."65
56. Id. at 949.
57. American Thoracic Society, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining
Therapy, 115 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 478, 481 (1991).

58. See Kerridge,supra note 51, at 879.
59. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 10, at 938.
60. Donald Murphy & Thomas Finucane, New Do-Not-Resuscitate Policies: A First
Step in Cost Control, 152 ARCHIVES INTERN MED. 1641, 1644 (Jul. 26, 1993).
61. John Lantos et al., The Illusion ofFutility in ClinicalPractice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81,

82 (1989)
62. Id. at 83.
63. E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Causalities of Coercion, 24
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 33, 33 (1994); see also R. Gillon, 'Futility'-Too Ambiguous

and Pejorative a Term? 23 J. MED. ETHICS 338, 340 (1997) (asserting "some words in
medicine [such as "futile"] have acquired so much pejorative baggage that they are probably
best regarded as medically obsolete, and consigned to the medical history books"); Id. at
340. In a 1991 report, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) of the American
Medical Association expressed concern regarding the use of futility as a basis for
withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). See Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA

1868, 1879 (1991). The Council noted significant variability among physicians with regard
to what constitutes futility, with some describing futility as a treatment with zero percent
chance of success, while others associate futility with success rates as high as thirteen
percent. Id. (citations omitted). The Council added, "[d]eterminations of futility also may
vary.. based on the perceived objectives of medical treatment and the criteria that are used
to evaluate outcome." Id.
64. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 10, at 938.
65. See Fine & Mayo, Advance Directive, Due Process, and Medical Futility, 150
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organizations adopted futility policies, 66 but the content of such
policies varies considerably. Some policies allow health care
providers to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment without the consent of the patient or a family member.
For example, a 1991 statement of the American Thoracic Society
entitled "Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining
Therapy" provides:
[A] life-sustaining intervention may be withheld or
withdrawn from a patient without the consent of the
patient or the surrogate if the intervention is judged to
be futile. A life-sustaining treatment is futile if
reasoning and experience indicate that the intervention
would be highly unlikely to result in meaningful
survival for that patient. 67
Other
policies
provide
that
treatments
deemed
"inappropriate" or "medically ineffective" may be withheld or
withdrawn. 68 A handful of states incorporated "medically
ineffective care" provisions from the Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act (UHCDA) into their laws. 69 In 1999, the Texas
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 404 (2004).
66. See generally Johnson et al., supra note 10.
67. American Thoracic Society, Medical Section of the American Lung Association,
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REV. RESPIR. DISEASE
726, 728 (1991).
68. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
69. At publication, eight states have adopted the medically ineffective care provisions
of the UHCDA: Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, and
New Mexico. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(f) (Westlaw through 2005 legislation); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4735 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §2508
(Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-7 (Westlaw through 2004
legislation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 5-807 (Westlaw through 2005 legislation);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-611 (Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-215 (Westlaw through 2005 legislation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7

(Westlaw through 2005 legislation). National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993)
at 1,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/uhcda93.pdf
In 1993,

available at
the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recognized that the promulgation of
state advance directives laws had resulted in rules that were fragmented and inconsistent.
The Commissioners developed the UHCDA in an attempt to provide consistent guidelines.
The UHCDA defines "medically ineffective" interventions as "treatment which would not
offer the patient any significant benefit" (See id. at §7 Comment) but does not describe the
necessary process for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments over the
objections of a patient or family member, except that the decision must be communicated to
family members, providers must assist in attempting to find a transfer facility, and the
treatment must be continued while an attempt to locate an alternative facility is made. See
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Legislature created a statutory futility policy that allows health
care providers to remove life-sustaining treatment over the
objections of the patient or family members. 70 The Texas
Advance Directives Act grants immunity from disciplinary
action and criminal and civil liability to health professionals who
follow a statutorily prescribed procedure for "failing to
effectuate" a patient's or surrogate's medical treatment
decision.7 1 Under the statute, health care providers can
unilaterally withhold or withdraw any treatment that providers
believe to be "inappropriate." 72
Statutory policies are subject to public scrutiny, but
unfortunately, published data describing the prevalence and
content of institutional futility policies is quite limited; the extent
to which such policies comply with published professional
guidelines is largely unknown.7 3 The limited data regarding the
content of institutional futility policies is mostly contained in a
research study published in 1997.74 In this survey, a team of
researchers examined 115 medical futility policies from hospitals
across the nation.7 5 The authors described significant differences
generally C.M. Galambos,. Preserving End-of-Life Autonomy: The Patient SelfDeterminationAct and the Uniform Health Care DecisionsAct, 23 HEALTH & SOC. WORK
275, 275 (1998). David M. English, The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act and Its

Progress in the States, 15 ABA PROB. & PROP. 19, 19-20 (May-Jun. 2001) (reviewing the
utilization of the UHCDA by states). The UHCDA contains provisions that permit
physicians to withhold or withdraw treatment contrary to a patient or surrogate's preferences
for reasons of conscience or when the physician determines that the treatment would be
"medically ineffective or contrary to generally accepted health-care standards."
70. See TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.045(d) (Westlaw through 2005
legislation).
71. TExAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 166.045(d)

provides: "A physician, health

professional acting under the direction of a physician, or health care facility is not civilly or
criminally liable or subject to review or disciplinary action by the person's appropriate
licensing board if the person has complied with the procedures outlined in Section 166.046."
72. This term is not defined in the statute. See id
73. See Lawrence Schneiderman & Alexander Morgan Capron, How Can Hospital
Futility Policies Contribute to Establishing Standards of Practice? 9 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHics 524, 529 (2000) ("No data exist on futility policies adopted by

hospitals in California, much less across the nation.).
74. See Johnson et al., supra note 10, at 27. Generally, organizational and community
policies appear more accessible, with many available on the internet. Institutional policies
are less accessible.
75. Id. Researchers sent surveys to 1,990 U.S. hospitals with more than 200 beds.
Approximately 485 (28%) of the hospitals responded. Id. Of the respondents, 137 (26%)
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in the policies and identified a number of aspects in which they
found the policies lacking. 76
Researchers noted that most of the policies did not attempt
to identify the circumstances in which treatment should be
described as futile, and those that did offered widely varying
definitions." The authors also noted significant variations in the
procedural aspects of the examined policies; some policies
emphasized the decision-making authority of physicians while
others provided that the patient or surrogate had the ultimate
decision-making authority.78 Policies also differed in that some
promoted extensive negotiation between interested parties, but
others merely provided that physicians need not provide
treatment deemed futile.79
Provisions requiring the involvement of institutional ethics
committees were also a source of dissimilarity in the policies. 0
Although many policies recommended consulting an institutional
ethics committee, very few policies specifically required the
committee's involvement.8 ' Those that did require ethics
committee involvement did so under very limited
circumstances.82 Finally, researchers noted that while most of
the reviewed policies explicitly stated that the provider must
inform the patient or surrogate of the futility judgment, some
only recommended informing the patient or surrogate, and
others made no provision for the disclosure of futility
judgments, again merely stating that the physician need not

stated that they has explicit, written medical futility policies, 115 (84%) of these hospitals
forwarded copies of their policies to researchers. Id. The authors reported only on those
policies that were clearly identified as medical futility policies and that went beyond the
question of issuing of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders. Id. None of the policies were identified
by state and at present there are no published reports describing the prevalence or content of
futility policies in Wisconsin.
76. Id. at 27-29.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 30.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 31.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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offer treatment deemed "futile" or "inappropriate."a
A disturbing lack of information about the use of both
institutional and statutory futility policies exists." At the
writing of this essay, no reports surveying the circumstances in
which institutional futility policies have been invoked have been
published.85 In 2003, ethics consultants at Baylor University
Medical Center in Dallas published a short paper describing
their experience with the Texas law. 86 In the report, the authors
described six cases that proceeded through the statutory
mechanism. 87 Of the six cases, three families agreed to withdraw
support shortly after receiving the written report of the ethics
committee; two patients died during the ten day waiting period
without having found an alternative provider; and one patient,
for whom a transfer facility had been located, died while
awaiting transfer." However, the Baylor report included clinical
information about only one of the patients and did not describe
the providers involved or the interventions that were the subject
of dispute.89
83. Id. at 30.
84. See id

85. See Asch et al., supra note 13, at 289 (noting "the empirical research that could
help define current physician practice in this area is almost exclusively anecdotal").
86. Robert Fine & Thomas W. Mayo, Resolution of Futility by Due Process: Early
Experience with the Texas Advance Directive Act, 138 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 743, 743

(2003).
87. Id at 745.

88. Id
89. Id. More recently, the local media has reported on the application of the Texas law,
which has resulted in at least some documentation of the circumstances giving rise to
disputes. For example, in 2005, a hospital acting pursuant to the Texas statute removed a
critically ill infant from life support over the objections of his mother. See Bruce Nichols,
HospitalEnds Life Support of Baby: 1st U.S. Case of Its Kind is Against Mom's Wish, in

Accordance With Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at IA. The infant, Sun
Hudson, was born in September, 2004 with thanatophoric dysplasia, a genetic defect that
results in impaired lung and chest development. See Case Digest, Hudson v. Texas
Children's Hospital: Houston's First Circuit Court ofAppeals: Civil Practice,21(2) Texas

Lawyer 31 (2005). Shortly after birth, Sun's physicians placed him on a ventilator. Id
Later, physicians recommended that the ventilator be removed, contending that continued
ventilatory support was futile, and therefore ethically and medically inappropriate. Id. Sun's
mother disagreed with the recommendation to withdraw the ventilator and sought a court
order preventing the withdrawal. Id. An appellate court barred the removal until a
procedural issue could be resolved, but upon resolution of the procedural problem, Ms.
Hudson's attorney reported that he did not have the resources to pursue other legal actions.
A court lifted a restraining order that prevented the hospital from removing of life-sustaining
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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF UNILATERAL WITHHOLDING OR
WITHDRAWAL BASED ON MEDICAL FUTILITY

In addition to the lack of consensus regarding the
identification of "futile" medical interventions and the paucity
of information about the content and use of futility policies,
opinions diverge about the use of medical futility as an ethical
justification for unilateral decision-making. 90 In generally, four
bioethical principles have gained widespread acceptance in the
analysis of ethical issues that arise in medicine: respect for
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice.9" While
each of these principles describes an important moral duty, the
individual duties are not absolute. 9 2 Instead, each principle
describes a prima facie obligation that must be balanced with the
demands of competing moral considerations.93 Under the
principalist approach, the obligations of health care providers
are determined by a thoughtful weighing of these sometimes
conflicting imperatives. Ultimately, clinicians must consider
and weigh each imperative, determine which principle or
treatment. The infant's mother initially secured a court order barring the removal, but after
multiple attempts to transfer the infant failed, the mother's attorney reported that he did not
have the resources to pursue other legal action. See Leigh Hopper, Life-Support to be Shut
Off Today: Mother's Lawyer Says He Has No Plans to Appeal Hospital's Decision,

HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 15, 2005, at IB (Newspaper accounts state that the hospital
involved encouraged Ms. Hudson to pursue legal action and offered to pay her attorney.).
The hospital removed the ventilator, followed shortly thereafter by the death of the infant.
See Nichols, supra at IA.
90. See Asch et al., supra note 13, at 288 & 291 (stating "[i]t is doubtful that ethical
principles regarding the appropriate practical definition of medical futility will ever be
noncontroversial").
91. The principalist approach was developed by professors Tom Beauchamp and James
Childress in their seminal text. See generally TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHIcS (4 th ed. 1994). Later, this approach was adopted by
influential governmental ethics commissions. See National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1978)

available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. The principalist approach has
often been used to analyze the ethical justification of unilateral actions based on medical
futility. See, e.g., John Luce, PhysiciansDo Not Have a Responsibility to Provide Futile or
Unreasonable Care If a Patient or Family Insists, 23 CRIT. CARE MED. 760, 760 (1995)

(briefly describing and applying the four principles of autonomy, beneficence,
nonnialeficence, and justice).
92. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 91, at 126.
93. Id.

2006]

MEDICAL FUTILITY

331

principles are most significant under the circumstances, and
choose a course of action that best reflects these principles. 94
Futility policy supporters assert that physicians are ethically
justified in unilaterally withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatments on the basis of medical futility because
such actions are supported by the ethical principles of
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.95 Supporters of
physician discretion also contend that the principle of respect for
patient autonomy, while relevant to the analysis, does not create
a positive right to demand specific treatment. 96 In addition,
policy supporters argue that the issue of whether a particular
treatment's benefit is substantial enough to render it a viable
option is a matter of professional judgment and integrity.9 7
Critics respond that the use of medical futility as a basis for
the unilateral withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments is not
sufficiently justified by claims of beneficence, justice, or
professional integrity and that advocates of medical futility
policies unacceptably neglect the duty to respect patient
autonomy. 98 According to these critics, an appeal to futility does
not adequately justify unilateral action and "the rapid advance
of the language of futility... should be followed by an equally
rapid retreat."99
BENEFICENCE AND NONMALEFICENCE

94. Id
95. See Luce, supra note 91, at 760.
96. See Clare M. Clarke, Do Parents of Surrogates Have the Right to Demand Care
Treatment Deemed Futile? An Analysis of the Case of Baby L., 32 J. ADVANCED NURSING
757,758 (2000).

97. See infra notes 110-115.
98. See Moseley et al., supra note 49, at 214.
99. See Robert Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1560,
1563 (1992). How patients feel about providers' invocation of medical futility to justify
unilateral decisionmaking has not been extensively studied. But see J. Randall Curtis, The
Attitudes ofPatients With Advanced AIDS Toward the Use of Medical Futility Rationale in
Decisions to Forgo Mechanical Ventilation, 120 ARCHIVES INTERN. MED. 1597, 1600
(2000) (reporting that in a survey of 57 patients with advanced AIDS, the majority of
patients (61%) accepted the use of medical futility as a rationale for withholding mechanical

ventilation, but a substantial minority (12%) did not).
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The principle of beneficence requires that physicians act in
ways that promote the well-being of their patients.100 The
principle of nonmaleficence is a complementary imperative.
While beneficence implies a positive duty to act in accordance
with patient interests, nonmaleficence imposes a duty on
physicians to avoid actions that may result in unnecessary
harm.101

Policy supporters assert that the discretion to make futility
judgments is essential to a physician's adherence to the ethical
obligations of beneficence and nonmaleficence.102 According to
this view, physicians are only morally obligated to provide care
that has a reasonable chance of achieving some therapeutic
benefit. 0 Because interventions deemed futile provide little or
no substantial benefit, physicians are not ethically obligated to
provide them104 Furthermore, because futile interventions may
involve a potential risk of harm, the provision of such treatment
violates the principle of nonmaleficence.s05
However, critics contend that reliance on the ethical
principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence as justification for
decision-making that is opposed to patient or family preferences
is flawed.106 According to these critics, physicians are indeed
obligated to act in ways that benefit patients, but the question of
whether an intervention provides a significant benefit is an
inherently subjective and value-laden determination.10 7 As a
result, such decisions are best made by the patient himself, or by
100. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 91, at 260.
101. See generally BERNARD Lo, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR

CLINICIANS 12 (2d ed. 2000).
102. See Lawrence Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Response to Critiques, 125
ANNALS INTERN. MED. 669, 670 (1996) [hereinafter Response to Critiques] (stating "the

power to make judgments about futility is a necessary part of the physician's duty of
beneficence").
103. See id See also W. Daniel Doty & Robert Walker, Medical Futility, 23 CLINICAL

CARDIOLOGY (Supp. II) 11-6, 11-6 (2000).
104. See id.
105. See Schneiderman, Response to Critiques, supra note 102, at 670.

106. See Frick et al., supra note 29, at 459-460.
107. Id. at 459 (The only common feature of futility judgments is that they inherently
involve of a question of benefit, which necessarily implies a value judgment on the part of
the physician.).
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someone who is intimately familiar with the patient's personal
beliefs and values.
While health care professionals
make important
contributions to discussions regarding end-of-life treatment by
providing essential information about treatment alternatives and
potential risks and benefits, they are ill-equipped to determine
how these variables will be interpreted and weighed by
individual patients.
In fact, research demonstrates that
physicians often have poor understandings of patient
preferences and that most patients do not discuss their personal
values or treatment preferences with their physicians.10 As a
result, what a patient regards as worthwhile may differ
substantially from the physician's assessments, and a physician
who acts contrary to a patient's or family member's assessment
of benefit merely substitutes his or her personal values for those
of the patient or family member.
For example, a physician may conclude that long-term
ventilator support for a patient suffering from a terminal illness
is futile because he believes that it will not change the outcome,
but may increase suffering and prolong the dying process.
However, a patient may be willing to accept the burdens of the
ventilator due to deeply held religious beliefs, or simply because
it will allow him to spend a little more time with his family. A
physician can assert no ethical grounds that his or her
assessment of the potential benefit is preferable and should
control.
Critics also assert that allowing a provider-driven
assessment of benefit to dominate decision-making is
problematic because empirical studies have repeatedly
demonstrated that physicians' predictions of their patients'
future quality of life are inaccurate and unreliable.10 9 For
108. Kenneth Covinsky et al., Communication and Decisionmaking in Seriously Ill
Patients: Findings of the SUPPORT Project. 48 J. AM. GERIATR. Soc., (Supp. 5) S187,

S187 (2000) (finding "[pihysician, nurse, and surrogate understanding of their patient's
preferences is only moderately better than chance").
109. See Susan Goold et al., Conflicts Regarding Decisions to Limit Treatment: A
Diferential Diagnosis, 283 JAMA 909, 912 (2000) ("Physicians tend to underestimate
chronically ill patients' quality of life, and are more likely than patients or families to think
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instance, in a 2003 study, researchers collected data describing
physicians' and nurses' predictions of their patients' futures,
including their opinions about whether treatment should be
discontinued.'10 The authors later compared the findings to data
obtained during follow-up interviews with former patients."'
The researchers found, "Neither nurses nor doctors could
reliably predict who would be satisfied with his or her [quality
of life] QOL 6 months after ICU admission."" 2 The authors
concluded that health care providers cannot accurately predict
quality of life," 3 and they advised "[u]tmost caution has to be
applied when future QOL as presumed by nurses and doctors is
used as an argument for withholding or withdrawing further
treatment."4
JUSTICE

The principle of justice is an important consideration,
particularly when the intervention in question is expensive. This
principle requires that physicians make judicious use of limited
health care resources and attempt to ensure fairness in the
distribution of such resources." 5 Supporters of medical futility
policies assert that the provision of futile medical treatment
violates this principle by investing valuable resources in
treatment that will not produce favorable outcomes, while
others struggle to obtain access to even basic care.116
Meanwhile, critics maintain that reliance on the principle of
such patients would choose to forgo life-sustaining treatment."). Bekele Afessa et al.,
Identifying Potentially Ineffective Care in the Sickest Critically Ill Patients on the Third ICU

Day, 126 CHEST 1905, 1905 (2004) ("A number of studies have reported poor performance
of critical care providers in predicting futility of care."). Truog et al., supra note 99, at 1561
("[P]hysicians are often highly unreliable in estimating the likelihood of success of a
therapeutic intervention.").
110. Frick et al., supra note 29, at 456.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 459.

113. Id. at 459-460.
114. Id. at 460.
115. See LO, supra note 101, at 13.

116. See generally Luce, supra note 91, at 764 (discussing the principle of justice in
relation to futility).
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justice is misguided because unilateral end-of-life decisionmaking is not a legitimate means of resource allocation. First,
there is little empirical evidence that eliminating "futile"
treatment will result in significant cost savings, 17 particularly
when compared to other potential cost-cutting measures.118
[E]ven if life-sustaining treatment had been withdrawn
from all patients in the SUPPORT study [a well known
end-of-life study involving over four thousand
patients]... it would have resulted in only a 13%
reduction in costs for the entire cohort.. .. This cost
savings would be minimal compared with eliminating
other highly cost-ineffective interventions that may be
provided
more
frequently
with
less
grave
consequences.. .119
Even if a substantial reduction in costs could be realized,
any "savings" achieved from the withdrawal of treatment from
an individual patient is not necessarily channeled to other
supposedly more worthwhile patients. 120 Critics acknowledge
that end-of-life medical care can be extremely costly, but they
argue that any decision to reallocate resources should be made
as a matter of public policy and subject to public scrutiny.12
They also assert that while the expertise of physicians is essential
117. See Amir Halevy et al., The Low Frequency of Futility in An Adult Intensive Care
Unit Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERN. MED. 100 (Jan. 8, 1996) (abstract) ("The frequency of
futile interventions appears to be low unless one is willing to accept a definition that
includes patients who could survive for many months. If confirmed in other settings, this
suggests that concepts of futility will not play a major role in cost containment."). See also
Alexander Capron, Medical Futility: Strike Two, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 42, 43
(Sept. 1994) (noting that "evidence is beginning to accumulate that cutting futile care offers
no great savings," and asserting "'medical futility"'. . lacks the economic payoff that some
might see as a legitimate trade-off for its ethical problems."). Marion Danis et al., A
Prospective Study of the Impact of Patient Preferences on Life-Sustaining Treatment and

Hospital Cost, 24 CRIT. CARE MED. 1811, 1817 (1996) (noting that "there is little
systematic evidence that patient treatment preferences generally influence actual treatment
use or cost;" therefore, "futility policies that override patient wishes may yield little savings
and much divisiveness").
118. John Luce & Gordon Rubenfeld, Can Health Care Costs be reduced by Limiting
Intensive Care at End of Life? 165 AM. J. REsPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 750, 750 (Mar. 15,

2002).
119. Id. at 752 (also noting, "[n]early all of this savings would have been attributable to
care that would have been withdrawn from 12 patients, including younger patients and those
with religious convictions not to have life support withdrawn").
120. See Moseley et al., supra note 49, at 214.
121. Id
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to public debate concerning allocation policies, physicians
should avoid an attempt to apply such expertise to individual
bedside rationing decisions.'2
Because health care providers cannot agree on a practical
definition of "futile" treatment and cannot accurately predict an
individual patient's outcome, bedside resource-driven
withholding or withdrawal decisions are vulnerable to
individual biases and risk being characterized as arbitrary and
unfair.lu Interestingly, in a study that highlights the relationship
between cost and the inability to identify "futile" treatment, the
most expensive ICU patients were those who had a long length
of stay in the ICU and had outcomes that were in opposition to
what physicians originally predicted. 12 4 Thus, the care provided
to those patients who were incorrectly predicted to die and those
incorrectly predicted to live cost the most.125 As a result, critics
warn that using resource allocation rationale as a justification for
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from an
individual patient will not be well-received and may ultimately
undermine trust.
RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY

Respect for patient autonomy is the cornerstone of ethical
decision-making in medicine and serves as the basis for the
clearly established principle that a competent patient has the
right to make decisions regarding his or her medical
treatment.12 6 Over a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of respect for individual autonomy
when it concluded that a person could not be ordered to submit
to a surgical intervention.127 The Court held, "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded ... than the right of
122. Id. at 214.
123. See id.
124. Allan Detsky et al., Prognosis, Survival, and the Expenditure ofHospital Resources
for Patients in an Intensive Care Unit, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667, 667 (1981).
125. Id.
126. See BEAUcHAMP& CHILDRESS, supra note 91, at 125.
127. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law." 128
Supporters of futility policies recognize that unilateral
decision-making by physicians appears to be an affront to this
principle.
However, they contend that the principle of
autonomy confers a negative right to refuse unwanted
treatments, but it does not imply a corresponding positive "right
to demand" certain interventions.129 For example, respect for
autonomy does not require that a physician agree to provide
antibiotics for a patient suffering from a viral infection. These
policy supporters argue that the discretion to make decisions
based on medical futility is necessary to correct excesses of
patient autonomy, 13 0 and that maintaining the physician's
discretion to make medical futility determinations is essential to
professional integrity."'
According to Lawrence Schneiderman and his colleagues,
medical futility is "a professional judgment that takes
precedence over patient autonomy and permits physicians to
withhold or withdraw care deemed to be inappropriate without
subjecting such a decision to patient approval."1 2 Accordingly,
"[t]he treating physician's ethical obligations... logically limit
the patient's autonomous choices to those options the physician
can ethically offer.""' Another policy supporter asserted, "[T]he
profession that creates a treatment has innate authority and
obligation to prescribe its proper use." 3"
Supporters further argue that unilateral decision-making is
defensible because it is not based on individual, subjective
128. Id.
129. Clarke, supra note 96, at 762.
130. See Capron, supra note 117, at 42.
131. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility,supra note 55, at 953.
132. Id.
133. See Doty & Walker, supra note 103, at 11-8.
134. Id. See also SUSAN B. RuBIN, WHEN DOCTORS SAY NO: THE BATTLE GROUND OF
MEDICAL FUTILITY 61 (Indiana University Press 1998) ("Many physicians are convinced
that their clinical judgment entitles them to make not only judgments of factual
ineffectiveness from a factual perspective, but also judgments of inappropriateness from an
evaluative perspective.").
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judgments, but on the standards of the profession.135
This power resides not with the individual physician's
arbitrary whim but with the profession as a whole as it
establishes general standards of care. In our view,
abuses of power are resolved not by eliminating
medical judgment and yielding to unreasonable
demands but rather by exercising judgment openly and
responsibly according to professional standards.136
However, critics assert that appeals to futility as justification
for unilateral decision-making are merely attempts to conceal
unwarranted medical paternalism. 37
They contend that
decisions regarding "futile" life-sustaining treatment should not
be removed from the carefully constructed requirements of the
informed consent process.13 8
They emphasize that the
overwhelming majority of patients and families agree with and
consent to the treatment recommendations of their physicians,
even when providers recommend the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment.'39 When conflicts do arise, most can be
resolved through extensive and focused negotiation without
compromising the patient's autonomy. Therefore, it is difficult
to accept the argument that physicians should not be required to
seek the consent of the many, merely because they will not be
able to secure it from the very few.140
Additionally, the lack of a consensus on appropriate end-oflife decision making practices undermines the contention that
providers are obligated to adhere to an accepted standard. In
other words, it is difficult to agree with the assertion that
physicians should be granted the authority act unilaterally
because they are complying with professional standards, when
135. Schneiderman et al., Response to Critiques, supra note 102, at 670.

136. Id.
137. Stuart Younger, Who Defines Futility, 260 JAMA 2094, 2095 (1988). See George
Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding Autonomy and the
Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. POL. 1, 18

(1995-1996).
138. See id.
139. See Giles Scofield, Medical Futility: Can We Talk? 18 GENERATiONS 66, 67

(Winter 1994) (noting that "the overwhelming majority of patients (94%) agree with their
physician's recommendation not to carry out medically futile treatment").
140. Id. at 67-68.
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the existence of such standards is questionable. 14 1 Furthermore,
even if such standards exist, why should "professional integrity"
be weighted more than other ethical obligations, particularly the
duty to respect patient autonomy? 142
The lack of a common understanding as to what constitutes
futile treatment is also problematic when futility is used to
override the individual's autonomous choices.
When
considering a life-sustaining treatment, if the intervention is
truly futile in a physiologic sense, the issue will quickly become
moot because the patient will die. Therefore, conflicts over
"futile" life-sustaining treatment exist only when some other
ostensibly less objective definition of futility is applied.
Allowing health care providers to substitute their subjective
assessment of the risks and burdens of treatment for that of a
patient should be rejected, because it falsely presumes that "bias,
prejudice, and other subjective considerations do not affect
physician judgment in this area." 143
The notion that health care providers possess an innate
authority to make decisions without the input of patients and
their families is also not well supported. In fact, research has
shown that almost all patients prefer that if they become
incompetent, decisions regarding life-sustaining medical

141. Interestingly, when confronted with the notion that the state could override a patient
or surrogate decision to refuse life-sustaining care, the American Medical Association
emphasized the autonomy of patients, arguing:
Physicians will always strive vigorously to assist those who want help in their
struggle against death. Nevertheless, the reality of modem science is that some
patients, though permanently unconscious and thus without hope of recovery, can
be sustained solely by means of medical treatment and sophisticated technology.
For these patients, the ultimate judgment about the proper course of medical care
should be made by those most directly affected-the patient or surrogate-and not
by the state ....
See Brief for the American Medical Association et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1989) (No. 88-1503), 1989
WL 1115247.
142. See generally P. Biegler, Should Patient Consent Be Required to Write a Do Not
Resuscitate Order? 29 J. MED. ETHIcS 359, 361 (2003).
143. Id. ("While we might like to believe that judgments about medically futile
treatment are value-free, objective, constant, and certain, they are as value-laden, subjective,
varied, and uncertain as every other medical judgment is. For this reason, such decisions
should be part of, not exempt from, the informed consent process.").
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treatment should be made by their family members.144 Again,
critics warn that this presumed authority undermines the
autonomy of patients; actions taken under the guise of assumed
authority will severely weaken patient trust. 45 The resulting
mistrust will only exacerbate, rather than resolve, end-of-life
treatment conflicts. 46
Finally, it is not particularly useful or accurate to
characterize futility policies as guidelines that are necessary to
contend with unreasonable family members who "demand"
ineffective treatment. While data is limited, most futility
disputes appear to involve interventions that have been
previously offered, recommended, or implemented by health
care providers.147 Assuming providers were not disingenuous in
initiating treatment in the first place, at some point the health
care providers maintained that the treatment in question was
indeed a viable medical option. Disputes over "futile" treatment
appear to arise much later, when providers come to believe that
the predicted benefit is not achievable or simply not worthwhile.
Thus, in many futility disputes it is family members who seek to
maintain the status quo, and health care providers who
"demand" withdrawal. Considering that weighing the burdens
and benefits of treatments is a highly subjective process and that
the perspectives of providers and family members differ
significantly, it should not be unexpected, or regarded as
unreasonable, that family members occasionally reject the
calculus of health care providers.
Policy critic Robert Burt has suggested that a providerfamily dispute is best understood as a conflict in which the
principles of patient autonomy and physician integrity "are
essentially in equipoise, without an overarching principle of

144. Laura Hanson et al., What is Wrong with End of Life Care? Opinions of Bereaved

Family Members, 45 J. AM. GERIATR. SOC. 1339, 1343 (1997) (finding 90% of patients
prefer family members to act as the decision makers and request that decisions be made in
conjunction with their physicians).
145. See Mebane et al., supra note 21, at 586.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 67.
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resolution."148 Burt contends that effective dispute resolution
can only be achieved through a process of negotiation149 in
which each party to the conflict has "a mutually recognized,
independent source of influence and authority to exert against
the opposing party."150 According to Burt, the "basic problem"
with policies that permit unilateral decision-making is that such
policies do not promote fair negotiation and stand "too ready to
serve physicians as a conversation stopper."151
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to unanswered ethical concerns, the legality of
institutional or statutory futility policies is questionable. When
presented with disputes regarding medical treatment, courts
have consistently emphasized two important concepts: first, that
an adult, competent patient has a constitutionally protected right
to determine what shall be done to his or her body;152 and
second, that this right of self-determination extends to

148. Robert Burt, The Medical Futility Debate: Patient Choice, Physician Obligation,
andEnd-of-Life Care, 5 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 249, 253 (2002).
149. Id. at 249.
150. Id. at 254.

151. Id. See also Thomas Prendergast, 283 JAMA 3198, 3200 (2000) (letter to the
editor, stating "[flutility is a conflict resolution strategy based on power, not persuasion").
152. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891) (emphasizing the
importance of respect for individual autonomy in a case in which the Court concluded a
person could not be ordered to submit to a surgical intervention); Tune v. Walter Reed Army
Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.C. 1985) (granting a competent patient's request for an
order directing the removal of life support because the various state interests were
insufficient to outweigh the patient's interest in self-determination); Deel v. Syracuse
Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that an individual
has a constitutional right, whether recognized as a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause, or an aspect of the right to privacy, to refuse or discontinue life-sustaining
medical treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (recognizing a constitutionally protected right of privacy that includes the right to
direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a competent adult patient has the right to direct
the withdrawal of treatment, even if it is contrary to physician recommendations.); Bouvia v.
Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that competent patient's right to refuse medical treatment entitled her to removal of a
feeding tube despite the life-sustaining nature of the treatment); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551
N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that the right to refuse treatment is based in both common
and constitutional law).
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incompetent patients through surrogate decision makers. 53 The
right of self-determination is an aspect of personal liberty that is
carefully guarded by a combination of common law and
constitutional guarantees, and it cannot be restricted or infringed
without due process of law. Futility policies that allow
providers to substitute their judgment for that of a competent
patient or a duly appointed surrogate violate the common law
principle of self-determination and constitutional guarantees of
procedural due process. 5
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to make fundamental medical decisions is an
aspect of self-determination that is jealously guarded by
common law and constitutional guarantees. 55 This common law
principle has evolved into the widely accepted doctrine of
informed consent, which requires that a competent adult be
provided with sufficient information and the opportunity to
make her own personal medical decisions without the

153. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that an
incompetent patient had a constitutional right to privacy, which included the right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment, that could be exercised by the patient's guardian.); In re
Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-73 (N.Y. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (affirming an
order to withdraw a ventilator from an incompetent patient because the withdrawal was
consistent with the patient's repeated, stated wishes while competent); Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that a guardian had the right to exercise an
incapacitated patient's right to refuse medical treatment). See also Conservatorship of
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (Ct. App. 1988); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 756 (Md.
1993); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996); In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1068 (Del.
1995).
154. In addition such policies may violate constitutional guarantees of privacy, freedom
of religion, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and to the extent that such
policies allow providers to override the documented treatment preferences of a competent
adult, such policies may conflict with state advance directive laws.
155. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating the
sterilization of habitual criminals on equal protection grounds); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (concluding that a statute which prohibited a person from using
contraception violated a federal right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(recognizing an unmarried couple's right of privacy in decisions concerning contraception).
While the majority of courts that have addressed this right have done so in the context of the
individual's right to refuse medical treatment, the principles explicated in these discussions
are instructive.
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interference of others. 56
The doctrine of informed consent emphasizes the primacy
of the individual in making personal medical treatment
decisions. In Cobbs v. Grant, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the role of health care providers in the informed
consent process is necessarily restricted, asserting that the
expertise and authority of health care providers extends only to
advising the patient and providing sufficient information
regarding the risks and benefits of various treatment
alternatives.1 57 Weighing the risks and benefits of treatment is a
subjective process that is beyond the scope of the physician's
expertise, a "non-medical judgment reserved to the patient
alone." 58
In addition to common law principles, courts have
consistently emphasized that an individual's right to make
personal decisions is protected by both federal and state
constitutional guarantees. Courts have found that the right of
self-determination emanates from a number of constitutional
sources. For example, some courts have characterized the right
to make personal medical decisions as an aspect of a
constitutionally protected right to privacy,'59 while other courts
156. See F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE, 1-98 (2d ed.
1990).

157. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 1972).
158. Id. at 243. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985) (informed
consent only has meaning if it is respected even when it conflicts with doctor's advice or
values of the medical profession); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984)
(patient's rights must be "paramount to the interests of the patient's hospital and doctors");
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977) (if a
patient's right to refuse treatment is founded in "the right to bodily integrity ... and control
of one's own fate, then [it is] superior to the institutional considerations"). See also Bouvia
v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (1986) (emphatically denying
that the interests of the medical profession limit the patient's right to refuse treatment:
"Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment or life-support through a
mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her physicians to make....
It is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or courts of law.").
159. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch., 370 N.E.2d 417, 426-427; see also
Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984) (patient" right to refuse
treatment "has its origins in the constitutional right of privacy"); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (addressing the right to refuse based solely on
privacy). The right of privacy has been found by the court to be implicit in the concept of
liberty guaranteed by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113,
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have held that when an individual chooses a course of treatment
based on religious convictions, the individual's right to privacy
overlaps with the right to freely exercise personal religious
beliefs.16 0
Other courts have held that the right of self-determination
flows from a combination of common law and constitutional
sources. For example, according to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the right to make fundamental medical decisions
"emanates from the common law right. of self-determination and
informed consent, the personal liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and from the guarantee of liberty in
Article I, section I of the Wisconsin Constitution."1 61 In Fosmirev.
Nicoleau, the Court of Appeals of New York asserted that the
common law right of a competent adult to determine the course
of his or her own medical treatment is coextensive with a liberty
interest that is protected by the due process clause of the New
York Constitution.162
Regardless of the source, state and federal courts have
uniformly held that an individual's fundamental interest in
making medical treatment decisions is not lost upon a finding
that the patient lacks the capacity to communicate his or her
own choices. 63 According to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, "a patient's incompetency should not deprive him of a
liberty interest in 'making' treatment decisions. Such a rule
would have the absurd result of granting less protection to those
reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973),
reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973), and on remand, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert denied, 418
U.S. 939 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 887 (1974).
160. See Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 686-87 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987)
("Running through all of these decisions, however, is the courts' deeply imbedded belief,
rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an individual has a fundamental right to be left
alone so that he is free to lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from
unreasonable governmental interference. Surely nothing, in the last analysis, is more private
or more sacred than one's religion or view of life, and here the courts, quite properly, have
given great deference to the individual's right to make decisions vitally affecting his private
life according to his own conscience. It is difficult to overstate this right because it is,
without exaggeration, the very bedrock on which this country was founded.").
161. Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Wis. 1992).
162. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.Y. 1990).
163. See Guardianship ofL.W, 482 N.W.2d 60.
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incompetent patients who are in greater need of it."64

In an effort to extend constitutional protections to
incapacitated patients, courts have consistently concluded that if
a patient clearly communicated his or her preferences prior to
becoming incapacitated, those preferences should be honored. 16
In the absence of a clear statement by the patient, the patient's
spouse or another close family member is asked to recommend
the course of treatment that the patient himself would choose to
pursue based upon their intimate knowledge of the patient's
beliefs. Generally, family members are allowed to render their
best judgment, subject to certain qualifications and standards of
proof.'" The surrogate decision-making standards adopted by
courts reflect the commonly held belief that the preservation of
an incapacitated patient's right of self-determination requires an
intimate understanding the patient's personal values.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, neither the federal, nor state governments shall
deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." 6 7 The basic function of the due process clause
is to promote fairness and justice by ensuring that any restriction
or infringement on an individual's interest in life, liberty, or
property is preceded by certain procedures. To determine
whether a statute such as the Texas Advance Directive Act meets
procedural due process requirements, the court employs a twostep analysis.168
164. Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983). Wisconsin has joined this
consensus. See Guardianship ofL. W., 482 N.W.2d at 67.
165. See, e.g., Guardianship ofL.W., 482 N.W.2d 60.
166. See, e.g., Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.

167. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. Under the doctrine of procedural due process, "the
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty, or
property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such
an interest without due process of law." Casteel v. McCaughtry, 176 Wis. 2d 571, 579, 500
N.W.2d 277 (1993). Most state constitutions contain parallel provisions guaranteeing due
process for their citizens.
168. Jones, 165 U.S. 180.
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First, the court must determine whether there is a
constitutionally protected interest at issue. 69 Undoubtedly, the
right to make fundamental medical decisions, an essential aspect
of self-determination, is a protected liberty interest. Courts have
repeatedly recognized that decisions such as these are of such
personal import that the ability to make them without the
interference of others is essential to the concept of liberty.170
According to the U.S. Supreme Court:
While this court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed.... Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual . .. to enjoy

those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.'7 '
Because weighing the benefits and burdens of medical
treatment is a deeply personal process, particularly when the
treatment is life-sustaining, the ability to do so without the
inference of others is essential to concept of individual liberty.
According to the United States Supreme Court, "[a]t the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."172
Thus, just as the due process clause protects an interest in
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, it protects an
individual's right to decide whether to accept or continue such
treatment.' 73
In addition, a court must consider the individuals'
fundamental interest in life itself. A decision to withhold or
169. Id.
170. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). Protected personal decisions
have included the right to marry. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
171. Id.
172. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citation omitted).
173. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the individual's right to direct
the course of his own medical treatment is "properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest." Cruzan v. Dir. of Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279
(1990) (citation omitted).
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withdraw life-sustaining treatment will result in the death of the
patient and may have profound and lasting effects on family
members and other interested parties. 7 4 In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health,s75 a seminal end-of-life decisionmaking case, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted, "[ilt cannot be
disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life
as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment." 7 6
Once the court identifies a protected interest, the next step
of procedural due process analysis requires the court to consider
whether the procedures attendant to the deprivation or
encumbering of the identified interest provide sufficient
protection from error or abuse.1" Basic procedural requirements
include proper notice, 78 the opportunity for a meaningful
hearing,179 and access to an impartial decision-maker. 80 The U.S.
Supreme Court has articulated a balancing test to identify the
necessary procedures.18' Generally, the court must consider
three distinct factors: (1) the importance of the private interest
that will be affected; (2) the risk of error under current
procedures and the extent to which additional or substitute
procedures can increase the accuracy of decision-making, and (3)
the burdens that will result from requiring new or additional
procedures.182

174. While the withdrawal itself is done by private actors, when it is done pursuant to
statutory guidelines a court is likely to conclude it is state action.
175. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
176. Id. at 281.
177. Jones, 165 U.S. 180.
178. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudernill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."').
179. Id.
180. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
181. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976).
182. Id.
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RISKS OF ERROR

As discussed, disputes regarding "futile" life-sustaining
medical treatment implicate the patient's fundamental interests
in life and liberty. The need for effective protection of these
critical interests cannot be understated; any interference with
these private interests by health care providers must be
preceded by substantial procedural protections.
The potential for error and the inability to remedy such an
error is also an important concern.183 Courts confronted with
end-of-life treatment disputes have consistently emphasized that
states have an interest in preserving and protecting the lives of
their citizens from erroneous decisions or abuse.1 1 For example,
in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health,'s the United
States Supreme Court emphasized the serious nature of lifesustaining treatment decisions. 186 The Court noted that "an
erroneous decision to withdraw such treatment is not
susceptible of correction," and found that a state has a legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens from decisions made in error.187
Many state courts have echoed the concerns expressed by the
Cruzan court.188
In addition to decisions made in error, courts have
expressed concern about the potential for abuse and have
stressed the state's duty to protect vulnerable populations.
Citing Barry R. Furrow, the Wisconsin Supreme Court warned:
183. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
184. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. Health, 497 U.S. at 281; Matter of
M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 490 (1997) ("The reason this court requires a clear statement of the
ward's desires is because of the interest of the state in preserving human life and the
irreversible nature of the decision to withdraw nutrition from a person."); Conservatorship
of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 170 (Cal. 2001) (stating that an erroneous decision on the part of
a conservator "would represent the gravest possible affront to a conservatee's state
constitutional right to privacy" and concluding that "[t]he role of a high evidentiary standard
in such a case is to adjust the risk of error to favor the less perilous result.").
185. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
186. Id. at 281. ("The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of
obvious and overwhelming finality.").
187. Id. These interests have been echoed in numerous other cases involving disputes
over life-sustaining treatment.
188. See Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d at 547.
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While at first euthanasia may be institutionalized only
for those in terrible pain, or those who are terminally
ill, or those for whom it is otherwise appropriate, the
pressure of the allocation of health care resources will
inevitably enlarge the class for whom euthanasia is
deemed appropriate. Every society has a group who
are deemed to be socially unworthy and members of
that group-the uneducated, the unemployed, the
disabled, for example-will become good candidates
for euthanasia. 189
Policy supporters argue that the processes established in the
Texas statute provide sufficient protection from error and abuse.
The linchpins of this assertion are threefold (1) the ability of
providers
to
consistently
and
objectively
identify
"inappropriate" treatment, (2) the reliability of ethics or medical
committee review, and (3) the potential ability to transfer the
patient to another facility. However, none of these mechanisms
adequately prevent the statute from being arbitrarily or
capriciously applied, nor should they be considered sufficient to
ensure the protection of vulnerable populations.
The first problem with the assertion that the Texas statute
provides adequate protection against error and abuse is that the
statute is unacceptably overbroad and vague with regard to the
identification of "inappropriate" treatment. When treatment can
or should be described as "inappropriate" is not defined by the
statute. Certainly, if there is no professional consensus on how
to identify "futile" medical treatment, there is even less
agreement about what constitutes "inappropriate" treatment.
Although policy supporters have argued that the lack of a
precise definition is not problematic because "most physicians
now know it when they see it,"9 0 it is indeed troublesome that
the public will not see it when they know it. This lack of
189. Barry R. Furrow et al., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 325 (1991),

as cited in Matter of M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 490. See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 706 (1997) (emphasizing the state's interest in "protecting the poor, the elderly,
disabled persons, the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and
avoiding a possible slide towards voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.").
190. See Robert Fine & Thomas Mayo, Advance Directive, Due Process, and Medical
Futility, 140 ANNALS INTERN. MEDICINE 404, 404 (2004).
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boundaries and oversight allows the providers far too much
discretion.
The second problem is that although the basic requirement
of notice appears to be met, the Texas statute does not provide
for a meaningful hearing. A basic requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard.19 ' Such a hearing must be "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," and it must
provide interested persons with an effective opportunity to
communicate their position by confronting opposing opinions
and presenting their own arguments.192 Under the Texas statute,
the physician's decision to withhold or withdraw treatment
must be reviewed by a medical or ethics committee. 93 Although
providers or the committee may provide the patient or family
members a written description of the ethics or medical
committee review process, they are not required to do sO.194 In
addition, while providers must allow the patient or family
members to be present at committee deliberations, the extent of
their involvement or participation in the discussion is left to the
discretion of providers. 95
Thus, the statute does not ensure that the patient or family
members will have an adequate opportunity to present their
concerns.
In addition, considering the wide disparity in
expertise and authority that exists between health care providers
and patients and their families, the representation of counsel and
an adversarial proceeding may be necessary to ensure fairness.
According to the Cruzan court, "[an adversarial proceeding is of
particular importance when one side has a strong personal
interest which needs to be counterbalanced to assure the court
that the questions will be fully explored."' 9 6 It is notable that
courts have traditionally favored a less formalized process for
191. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
192. Id.
193. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(b)(1) (Westlaw through 2005
legislation).
194. Id
195. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §166.046(b)(4)(a) (Westlaw through 2005
legislation).
196. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 318.
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end-of-life decision-making, holding that that judicial
intervention and approval is unnecessary when a surrogate
seeks to make treatment decisions that are consistent with the
recommendations of health care providers and the patient's
prior express wishes.197 However, when significant questions or
disagreements arise, courts have emphasized the importance of
prior judicial authorization. 198
Third, while ethics or medical committees can provide
meaningful input and invaluable assistance in resolving
disputes,199 committee recommendations should not be regarded
as the findings of an impartial tribunal. Committee members are
often employees or administrators of the institution that is
providing the patient's treatment. Because the institution may
have a significant financial interest in the discontinuation of
treatment, financial and other political, hierarchical and
institutional pressures may unduly influence committee
members and create substantial conflicts of interest. 200 At least
one court has questioned whether an institutional ethics
committee that offered recommendations in an end-of-life
decision-making dispute properly understood its purpose. 201
197. See, e.g., Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990). This applies
whether the patient has communicated his or her desires in oral declarations or through
written advance directives. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 691; Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d
1372, 1378 (1984) ("[I]f the treating physicians, the prognosis committee, and the guardian
are all in agreement that the incompetent patient's best interests are served by termination of
life sustaining treatment ... there is no need for judicial involvement in this decision.");
Matter of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1983) ("In cases where physicians agree on the
prognosis and a close family member uses his best judgment as a guardian to exercise the
rights of the incompetent, intervention by the courts would be little more than a formality.");
Barber v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
198. See, e.g., Matter of Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (N.J. 1987) ("[W]here the
Ombudsman determines that a patient . .. has left clear and convincing evidence that he or
she would not want to be sustained by life-support, judicial review of a surrogate's decision
to give effect to the patient's preference is unnecessary unless a conflict arises among the
surrogate decisionmaker, the family, the physician and the Ombudsman."); Guardianshipof
Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
199. See Lawrence Schneiderman et al., Effects of Ethics Consultations on
Nonbeneficial Life Sustaining Treatment in the Intensive Care Setting, 290 JAMA 1166,

1166 (2003).
200. At a minimum, committee review should come from outside the institution that is
treating the patient.
201. Matter of MF., 563 N.W.2d at 485. For a discussion of the role of ethics
committees, see Gregory A. Jaffe, Institutional Ethics Committees: Legitimate and Impartial
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Policy critics have also noted there are no widely accepted
standards for committee membership, training, or decisionmaking processes, 202 and have discouraged over-reliance on
ethics committee findings, asserting that committee processes
often lack reliability, 203 consistency, 204 transparency, 205
accountability, 206 and reviewability. 207
Finally, the ability to transfer the patient to another setting
is also an ineffective protective mechanism. Transferring a
seriously ill patient who is dependent on expensive technology
is inevitably complicated by economics. A potential receiving
institution may decline to accept a patient, not because of a
determination that the treatment the patient seeks is
inappropriate, but because the treatment in question is costly. 208
Considering all of the above, it appears there is a substantial
and worrisome risk that the Texas statute will result in error or

Review of Ethical Health Care Decisions, 10 J. LEGAL MEDICINE 393 (1989).
202. John C. Fletcher & Diane E. Hoffmann, Time to Experiment with Standards, 120

ANNALS INTERN. MED. 335, 335-338 (1994) ("[I]t is widely recognized that there is a
significant lack of data on the effectiveness of these committees and that committee
members often lack the requisite education and skills for effective participation in case
consultation. We argue that before granting ethics committees additional authority, there is a
need for more research on their performance and a period of experimentation with quality
standards governing their membership and operations." Janet Fleetwood and Stephanie S.
Unger, Institutional Ethics Committees and the Shield of Immunity, 120 ANNALS INTERN.

MED., 320, 321 (1994) ("the appropriate authority of ethics committees must be questioned
in light of the considerable variability among the composition of committees, the
qualifications of committee members, their familiarity with ethical concepts, and their
interpersonal skills").
203. Fleetwood and Unger, supra note 202, at 322 ( "Although long-standing discussion
has occurred there is scant research showing the soundness of recommendations from ethics
committees.").
204. Id. at 323.
205. Id. at 322 ( "The judicial process is scrutinized by the media and the public,
whereas ethics committee proceedings rarely receive the same public analysis.").
206. Id. ("[M]any ethics committees lack uniform procedural guidelines, a consistent
policy of notifying all involved parties that a committee discussion will occur, or an appeal
process.").
207. Id. ( "[U]unresolved concerns exist about the confidentiality and discoverability of
ethics committee proceedings, despite admonitions about the importance of committee
accountability, equitable access to committee services, clear documentation of
recommendations, and mechanisms for peer review.").
208. See Hopper, supra note 5 (reporting that the chief medical officer of a local hospital
stated "[a] patient's inability to pay for medical care combined with a prognosis that renders
further care futile are two reasons a hospital might suggest cutting off life support.").
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abuse. However, the analysis under this prong also requires the
court to determine whether new or additional procedures will
decrease the potential risk. Clearly, expanding the applicable
procedural requirements, including providing guidelines for the
decisions made by health care providers, allowing for a
meaningful hearing, and establishing review by an impartial
tribunal will significantly reduce the risk of error and abuse.
BURDENS OF NEW AND ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES

Finally, a court must consider the burden of new or
additional procedures. Considering the infrequency with which
futility disputes arise, requiring judicial review and
authorization does not appear to be unduly burdensome for
courts. At present, intractable conflicts between patients,
families, and providers regarding "futile" end-of-life treatment
are somewhat rare,2 19 and most can be resolved through
extensive negotiation between the parties. In order provide the
necessary procedural protections, a court need not necessarily
create "new" procedures. In an effort to promote and protect
the vital interests of patients who lack decision-making capacity,
courts have already adopted relatively consistent surrogate
decision-making standards that apply when someone other than
the patient herself makes medical treatment decisions. 21 0 Courts
209. In the vast majority of such disputes patients, family members, and providers are
able to achieve consensus on the desired course of treatment after careful discussion. In
addition, most end-of-life treatment conflicts do not involve patients or families who seek to
continue futile treatment, but rather result from situations in which providers' seek to
continue aggressive treatment despite patient or family preferences to pursue less aggressive
care. See Breen et al., supra note 28, at 286. In the 2001 study, 76% of the provider-family
conflicts identified involved cases in which the staff wanted a more aggressive approach;
24% involved cases in which the family wanted to continue aggressive treatment. Id. See
also Asch et al., supra note 13, at 288 (reporting that 34% of ICU physicians surveyed
reported that they had continued life-sustaining treatment over the objections of patients and
family members.); Joan Teno et al., Medical Care Inconsistent With Patients' Treatment
Goals: Association With 1-year Medicare Resource Use and Survival, 50J. AM. GERIATR.

Soc. 496, 496 (2002) (finding "86% of the patients who wanted aggressive treatment
reported that care was consistent with their preferences, but only 41% of those who
preferred comfort care reported that care was consistent with their preferences. More than
one-third of those with a preference for comfort care (35%) reported that the medical care
that they received was inconsistent with their goals.") Id. at 496.
210. See, e.g., Matter of M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 591 (1997).
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have also approved the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment despite family objections, but only when
the court was satisfied that certain evidentiary and procedural
requirements were met.211 Furthermore, the burden of
additional procedural requirements would fall most heavily,
and appropriately, on the party that seeks to direct the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment.
A careful analysis of all of the above factors indicates that
the individual patient's constitutionally protected rights to life
and liberty are not adequately protected by the procedural
mechanisms established under the Texas Advances Directive
Act and there is a significant risk that the Texas statute will be
unfairly and arbitrarily applied. The consequence of an
erroneous or capricious decision will be the death of the patient,
thus additional procedural protections are necessary to ensure
fairness and justice.
CONCLUSION

Institutional and statutory medical futility policies are intended
to provide a mechanism for the resolution of disagreements in
which patients or family members seek treatment that health
care providers do not consider worthwhile. However, despite
the lack of consensus regarding best practices at end-of-life,
disagreement about an acceptable, practical definition of futile
treatment, and continued debate about the ethical justification of
unilateral decision-making, some institutions and states have
adopted policies that permit physicians to withhold or withdraw
life-support without the consent of patients or family members.
In addition to these concerns, there is a troubling lack of
information regarding the prevalence, content, and use of
medical futility policies. Critics have warned that such policies
significantly undermine the trust that is essential to the
physician-patient relationship and may exacerbate, rather than
211. See, e.g., In re K, 735 A.2d 448 (D.C. App. 1999); In re Tabatha R., 564 N.W.2d
598 (Neb. 1997). Most often this occurs when courts are confronted with abusive or
neglectful family members.
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assist, in resolving conflicts over end-of-life treatment.
The legality of institutional and statutory medical futility
policies is also questionable.
Because institutional futility
policies and statutes such as the Texas Advance Directive Act
allow providers to substitute their subjective opinions for those
of patients or family members without providing substantial or
effective procedural protections, such policies violate the
common law principle of self-determination and constitutional
guarantees of procedural due process.
Although policy
supporters contend that health care providers should be able to
withhold or withdraw futile treatment because they "know it
when they see it," the protection of individual rights demands
that the public see it when they know it. In order to ensure
fairness, consistency, and legitimacy in the management of
conflicts over life-sustaining medical treatment, the substantial
ethical and legal issues surrounding medical futility policies
must be actively and thoroughly addressed in a public forum.
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